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Craft and Power 
by Carl E. Schneider 
[I]t is as craftsmen that we get our sat-
isfactions and our pay. 
-Learned Hand 
The Bill of Rights 
0 liver Wendell Holmes-a great judge-said that "the com-
mand of the public force is in-
trusted to the judges in certain cases, 
and the whole power of the state will be 
put forth, if necessary, to carry out their 
judgments and decrees." Appellate 
courts command that force in ways that 
principle and practicalities leave little 
fettered. Judges must fetter themselves, 
not least by honoring the judicial duty 
of craftsmanship. 
That duty obliges courts to respect 
procedural rules, for they keep courts 
within their bounds and promote fair 
and sound decisions. That duty obliges 
courts to analyze legal authority scrupu-
lously, since judicial legitimacy depends 
on that authority. That duty obliges 
courts to explain their decision and rea-
soning lucidly, since only then can the 
litigants and we the governed tell what is 
required of us and see that the court 
acted lawfully. No court, no judge, no 
person always achieves high standards of 
craft. But a court that betrays its duty of 
craftsmanship is a court that has lost its 
moral authority and wrongfully asserted 
its legal power.1 
Such a court is the court that decided 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute. 2 
Grimes is the case (actually two cases 
consolidated in a single appeal) in which 
parents whose homes had been part of 
KKI's research into ways to abate the 
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dangers of lead paint in old buildings 
sued KKI on the grounds that KKI's 
negligence had harmed their children. 
They centrally claimed (the court seems 
to say) that KKI had failed to warn 
them properly about dangers to their 
children arising from the lead paint that 
had once been used in their homes. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals 
(Maryland's supreme court) eagerly 
commanded the public force. But its 
justification for its judgments and de-
crees fell intolerably short of the require-
ments of judicial craftsmanship in area 
after area. 
The most primitive requirement of 
the judge's craft is writing well enough 
to be understood. Even this task over-
whelms the Grimes court. Its opinion is 
swamped with errors in syntax, gram-
mar, punctuation, and even proofread-
ing. It is awash in sentences that cannot 
be parsed. It is flooded with passages so 
bungled that they stupefy more than 
clarify. For example: "If consent agree-
ments contain such provisions, and the 
trial court did not find otherwise, and 
we hold from our own examination of 
the record that such provisions were so 
contained, mutual assent, offer, accep-
tance, and consideration existed, all of 
which created contractual relationships 
imposing duties by reason of the con-
sent agreement themselves (as well, as 
we discuss elsewhere, by the very nature 
of such relationships)." Or: "Though 
not expressly recognized in the Mary-
land Code or in our prior cases as a type 
of relationship which creates a duty of 
care, evidence in the record suggests that 
such a relationship involving a duty or 
duties would ordinarily exist, and cer-
tainly could exist, based on the facts and 
circumstances of each of these individ-
ual cases." 
This is not how competent law stu-
dents, much less competent judges, 
write. All the students in my last brief-
writing course wrote more correctly and 
comprehensibly. 
Second, a court's duty of explanation 
requires it to set out a case's facts, its 
procedural history, and its legal issues. 
Grimes spends eight of its twenty-eight 
thousand words on the facts, but its ac-
count is so jumbled and disjointed that 
even a heroic reader retires defeated. Or-
dinarily, appeals go from trial courts to 
intermediate appellate courts, but the 
reader never learns how Maryland's 
highest court got the case. Statements of 
issues litter the opinion, but the reader 
can only wonder whether those are the 
issues the litigants actually posed. 
Third, a court's duty of justification 
obliges it to identify the governing law 
and then show how it applies to the is-
sues at hand. Grimes botched both 
obligations. 
The trial courts had granted KKI 
summary judgment because they con-
cluded that even if KKI had done every-
thing the plaintiffs alleged, it had violat-
ed no legal duty. The Court of Appeals' 
job was to decide whether the trial 
courts were wrong. One can certainly 
imagine a legal argument that Maryland 
law provided a remedy for the acts 
plaintiffs alleged. However, the court 
made no such argument. Indeed, it 
made no disciplined legal argument at 
all. 
The court's abandonment of legal ar-
gument is far too thoroughgoing to be 
surveyed here. A few examples of the 
many failures must suffice. For instance, 
the court said, "Of special interest to 
this Court, the Nuremberg Code, at 
least in significant part, was the result of 
legal thought and legal principles, as op-
posed to medical or scientific principles, 
and thus should be the preferred stan-
dard for assessing the legality of scientif-
ic research on human subjects. Under it, 
duties to research subjects arise." 
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So is the Nuremberg Code part of 
Maryland tort law? Apparently, since 
the code is the "preferred standard for 
assessing ... legality." But then what is 
the legal basis for incorporating the code 
in state law? Rather than answer that 
necessary question, the opinion unreels 
some 550 words (one-third of the 
length of this essay) from an academic 
article. Is the court adopting the article's 
reasoning? Surely not, because the arti-
cle reports that "only a handful [of 
cases] have even cited" the code and that 
"no United States court has ever award-
ed damages to an injured experimental 
subject, or punished an experimenter, 
on the basis of a violation of the Nurem-
berg Code." And if the code is law, 
which of its provisions apply to Grimes? 
How? Why? The court just slaps down 
the entire code and leaves the reader to 
supply the reasoning. 
Nor does the court make its legal 
case for incorporating the code into 
Maryland law in the paragraphs follow-
ing the article excerpt. Instead, it 
switches without explanation to (more 
than six hundred words worth of) an-
other academic article, which, the court 
says, "describes nontherapeutic experi-
mental research, differentiating it from 
therapeutic medical treatment." We lose 
track of the code until pages later, when 
the court drops a few more Delphic re-
marks about it. 
Eventually, the court invokes some 
undoubted Maryland law-cases that 
prescribe the legal tests the court is sup-
posed to apply. The court announces 
the tests' outcomes. But what is miss-
ing-systematically-is the reasoning 
by which the court moves from test to 
conclusion. Lawyers call this ipse dixit-
substituting assertion for argument. It is 
the Grimes court's maddening method. 
The legal basis for Grimes is further 
obscured because the court regularly 
transgresses the boundaries of its role. In 
America, trial courts "find" facts 
through procedures in which the parties 
present, challenge, and interpret evi-
dence. Appellate courts are not 
equipped to discover facts and are not 
supposed to try. In Grimes, summary 
judgments had preempted trials, and 
hence there were no reliably established 
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facts. Unfazed, the court chronically 
makes pronouncements that depend on 
conclusions about facts. (In a separate 
opinion, a judge who concurred in the 
court's result but rejected its opinion 
listed-conservatively-eleven factual 
findings about questions "not properly 
before this Court.") 
For example, the court says flatly, 
"Fully informed consent is lacking in 
these cases." How could the court 
know? As it admits, at least one plaintiff 
agreed to participate "[a]fter a discus-
sion regarding the nature, purpose, 
scope, and benefits of the study." What 
was said in that informed consent dis-
cussion is exactly the kind of factual 
issue that trial courts are designed to re-
solve and appellate courts cannot. 
Had the court stuck to the question 
that provoked the appeal-whether 
summary judgment was proper-its 
legal argument would have been bad 
and baffiing enough. But the court 
reached out to address other topics 
(even if the litigants hadn't been given 
their right to address them fully). These 
were "important" issues "of first impres-
sion'' (that is, issues no Maryland court 
had considered). The court "therefore 
attempted to address those issues in a 
full and exhaustive manner." "There-
fore" is backwards. Not only do 
supreme courts depend on trial courts 
to discover facts, they postpone entering 
legal debates until intermediate appel-
late courts have worked at them long 
enough for a mature understanding of 
the problem to emerge. 
But in the Grimes court rushed. For 
example, it conceded that "[t]he issue of 
the parents' right to consent on behalf 
of the children has not been fully pre-
sented." Nevertheless the court began its 
"Conclusion" by saying bluntly: "We 
hold that in Maryland a parent ... can-
not consent to the participation of a 
child ... in nontherapeutic research or 
studies in which there is any risk of in-
jury or damage to the health of the sub-
ject." When a court says "hold," it is an-
nouncing its considered resolution of a 
legal issue a case presents. This "hold-
ing," however, was so unexplained and 
unsettling that the court-most unusu-
ally-had to explain itself further in re-
sponse to a motion for reconsideration. 
The court said airily, ''As we think is 
dear from . . . the Opinion, by 'any 
risk,' we meant any articulable risk be-
yond the minimal kind of risk that is in-
herent in any endeavor." Did the court 
really think it was just clarifying what it 
said (more than once) in the opinion? 
Was it announcing a new standard? Did 
it understand what that standard meant 
and what its implications were? 
The Grimes court could not know 
what the litigants had actually done, 
how lead poisoning is caused and com-
bated, or how human subject research is 
conducted and regulated. Nevertheless, 
the opinion self-righteously denounces 
(with bald accusation and snide insinua-
tion) KKI, the Johns Hopkins IRB, and 
"the scientific community'' as dishonest 
and vicious. For instance, the IRB "en-
couraged the researchers to misrepresent 
the purpose of the research. 
. . . The IRB's purpose was ethically 
wrong and its understanding of the ex-
periment's benefit incorrect." The 
Grimes judges (who enjoy judicial im-
munity against libel suits) reach their 
shameful nadir when they compare the 
KKI researchers with Nazi "doctors." 
Judge not, that ye be not judged. For 
with what judgment ye judge, ye shall 
be judged. 
Learned Hand-a great judge-said 
that "for a judge to serve as communal 
mentor appears to me a very dubious 
addition to his duties and one apt to in-
terfere with their proper discharge." He 
could not have asked for better evidence 
than the opinion in Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Institute. Grimes is now a name 
in the litany of scandals used to justifY 
governmental regulation of human sub-
ject research. Grimes is treated respect-
fully because people trust courts. But 
this court fell so disgracefully below the 
standards of craftsmanship by which 
courts earn our trust that Grimes should 
be excised from our discourse. 
1. All this has nothing to do with judicial 
activism or restraint, with strict or liberal con-
structionism, all of which are regularly prac-
ticed with craftsmanlike skill. 
2. 782 A2d 807 (Md 2001). 
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